

# The Time of the Beautiful in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*

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**ABSTRACT:** The present article considers the problem of the preservation of pleasure in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. The problem stems from the fact that the *Critique of Judgment* contains not one but two distinct definitions of pleasure. In the definition of pleasure in §10 of the Analytic of the Beautiful Kant emphasizes that all pleasure is characterized by the tendency to preserve itself. On the other hand, in the definition of §VII of the unpublished Introduction Kant makes a sharp distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures, whereby only the former kind is defined by the tendency for self-preservation. Yet, how can the disinterested pleasure of the beautiful preserve itself, given that insofar as it is disinterested it can be based on neither desire for its own preservation nor continued existence of the object? In addressing this issue, most commentators erroneously reintroduce desire (whether explicitly or surreptitiously) in the pleasure of aesthetic reflection. By contrast, I propose to resolve this issue by turning to Kant's account of lingering in §12 of the Analytic of the Beautiful and, more importantly, §§43–53 of the Deduction, where Kant affords his conception of aesthetic ideas.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The present article considers the problem of the preservation of pleasure in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. In §10 of the Analytic of the Beautiful Kant defines pleasure in general in terms of its tendency for self-preservation: The goal of any pleasure is to maintain the state of pleasure itself. However, Kant also introduces an important distinction between two sorts of pleasure (e.g., in another definition of pleasure in §VII of the unpublished Introduction). On the one hand, there are those pleasures that involve an interest in the existence of the object, on the other hand, there are disinterested pleasures. The pleasure

of the beautiful is of the latter sort: It is not based on any interest and has no connection to the faculty of desire. It is not clear, however, how a disinterested pleasure can preserve itself, given that it can be based on neither desire for preservation nor continued existence of the object. The Analytic of the Beautiful is not particularly helpful with regard to this problem, for it does not say anything more about the preservation of aesthetic pleasure than that lingering over the beautiful involves a free play of the faculties. To resolve this problem, then, I turn to what might at first glance appear as a surprising place in the *Critique of Judgment*, namely, Kant's discussion of beautiful art and genius. Yet, it is in §§43–53 of the Deduction that Kant introduces his conception of aesthetic ideas. Now, according to §51 of the Deduction, any kind of beauty (whether it is natural beauty or art) is an expression of an aesthetic idea. Although Kant makes this connection but once in the entire *Critique of Judgment*, in this article I attempt to show that Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas is not only compatible with the account of the judgment of taste offered in the Analytic but can also help resolve the problem of the preservation of pleasure. That is, the disinterested pleasure of the beautiful maintains itself through cognitive means alone (albeit *without* thereby contributing anything to cognition), i.e., the free play of the mental faculties, which is in turn occasioned by an aesthetic idea that contains more thought than can be resolved in a determinate concept. It is thus precisely because an aesthetic idea in some way “resists” conceptual determination that the play of the faculties does not cease and we can correspondingly linger over the beautiful. Against some recent commentators, then, I conclude that the pleasure of reflection is self-maintaining, i.e., it neither has reference to the faculty of desire nor involves any kind of subjective “motivation” or “endeavoring” to remain in the pleasurable state.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. PLEASURE AND THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY

While the task assigned to the *Critique of the Judgment* lies in investigating the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in its *a priori* connection with the reflective power of judgment, there are not one but *two* different definitions of pleasure in this work. The first definition was provided by Kant in the Analytic of the Beautiful, §10 (which was composed earliest in the genesis of the *Critique of Judgment*, most likely, in 1788).<sup>2</sup> It reads: “The consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, for preserving [*erhalten*] it in that state, can here designate in general [*im allgemeinen*] what is called pleasure” (*KU, AA 05, 220:09–12*). On the other hand, in the First Introduction, which was composed right after the composition of the Analytic of the Beautiful (most probably, in 1789), Kant defines pleasure as follows:

Pleasure is a mental state in which a representation is in agreement with itself, as a ground, either merely for preserving [*erhalten*] this state itself (for the state of the powers of the mind reciprocally promoting each other in a representation preserves itself), or for producing [*hervorzubringen*] its object. (EEKU, AA 20, 230:11–231:02)

First of all, let us note that while Kant calls the first definition of pleasure (in §10 of the Analytic) general, he introduces the second definition (in the unpublished Introduction) as transcendental. Interestingly, however, the designations “general” and “transcendental” function in the same way here. So, the first definition can be called transcendental as much as the second one. For, although this is clearly not what Kant normally means by “transcendental,” he considers the second definition to be transcendental precisely because it is general. That is, it is “without regard to the distinction whether [pleasure] accompanies sensation, reflection or the determination of the will” (230:08–10).

Now, sensation, reflection and willing, whose respective objects are the agreeable, the beautiful and the good, correspond for Kant to “three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (KU, AA 05, 209:29–30). Although the pleasure of the agreeable depends on material sensation, and the good pleases through concepts, both types of pleasure have a relation to the faculty of desire.<sup>3</sup> Unlike the beautiful, then, the agreeable and the good please “not merely through the representation of the object but at the same time through the represented connection of the subject with the existence of the object” (209:19–21). What Kant means by this is that judgments of the good and of the agreeable involve *interest*, which is defined as “[t]he satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the existence of an object” (204:22–23). The judgment of the beautiful, on the other hand, “is merely contemplative, i.e., a judgment that, indifferent with regard to the existence of an object, merely connects its constitution together with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (209:22–25).<sup>4</sup> It is exactly this distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures that is anticipated in Kant’s transcendental definition in the unpublished Introduction (as opposed to the first definition in §10). For it mentions not one but two different ways in which a representation can serve as a ground (*Grund*) for pleasure. A representation can serve as a ground for either maintaining the mental state itself—for now, let us leave aside the exact nature of this maintaining—or for producing the object.<sup>5</sup> Given that production always implies an interest in the existence of the object, however, this distinction is just as much a distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures. Kant immediately confirms this: “If it is the former [i.e., the beautiful], then the judgment on the given object is an aesthetic judgment of reflection; however, if it is the latter [i.e., the agreeable or the good], then it is an aesthetic-pathological or an aesthetic-practical judgment” (EEKU, AA 20, 231:02.–232:01).<sup>6</sup> Yet, once the

definition of pleasure in the First Introduction contains the distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures, it becomes disjunctive. That is, it expresses a fundamental choice between two mutually excluding functions (or relations). And if it is disjunctive, then it is not general (or transcendental) in any sense; instead, the transcendental definition turns on the role of interest in pleasure. Then, although the transcendental definition in the unpublished Introduction specifies the crucial distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures, precisely in this it contradicts Kant's claim about its transcendental or general character. It is thus to be contrasted with the 1788 definition of pleasure in §10 of the *Analytic of the Beautiful* which defines *all* pleasures in terms the consciousness of the causality of a representation for maintaining the subject in a mental state. Indeed, it is the 1788 definition alone that can be called either general or transcendental in the full sense of the term.

The key to understanding how Kant was able to formulate a general definition of pleasure in 1788 *in spite of* the fundamental distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures lies in the nature of the pleasure of the senses (the agreeable). That is, if I find a particular object agreeable to my senses, then I am interested in the existence of objects of the same sort. Appropriately, in §3 of the *Analytic* Kant says: "that my judgment about an object by which I declare it agreeable expresses an interest in it is already clear from the fact that through sensation it excites a desire for objects of the same sort" (*KU*, AA 05, 206:37–207:03). But it may even be the *same object* that prolongs the sensation of pleasure, i.e., I might simply want to *keep the same object in existence*. As Zuckert (2007) suggests with her example of a chocolate bar, "one chocolate may bring me pleasure (in the agreeable) just like another does (and has done)" (264).<sup>7</sup> Here what Kant means by producing an object has to be understood very broadly, i.e., it refers not only to literally crafting an object but also to making it appear *simpliciter* (e.g., by finding it). What is of concern about this "producing" (*hervorbringen*, literally "bringing forth") is that it contains a reference to, first, the faculty of desire, and, second, the existence of the object (which are in fact one and the same thing).<sup>8</sup> But I only desire to keep the same agreeable object in existence (or more objects of the same sort), because I am motivated to preserve the sensation of agreeableness (as a mental state). It follows that the distinction between preserving the state of pleasure and producing the object is of *no importance* when dealing with the agreeable.<sup>9</sup> It simply does not matter whether we characterize the pleasure of the senses in terms of "maintaining" that pleasure or "bringing forth" the existence of the object. For to repeatedly produce the agreeable thing *just is* to maintain oneself in the pleasurable state of mind (e.g., eating one chocolate bar after another). And this is how—by reducing the agreeable to the function of preservation rather than that of production—a general definition of pleasure is made possible by Kant.<sup>10</sup>

Yet, having emphasized the interchangeability between “*erhalten*” and “*vorbringen*” in the case of interested pleasures, it is important to ask: Does the same interchangeability hold when it is a matter of the pleasure of aesthetic reflection? Likewise: Is the preservation of the pleasure of the senses the same as the preservation of the pleasure of reflection? To put it slightly different, is the term “*erhalten*” used univocally in the case of the beautiful and that of the agreeable? To be sure, the term “*erhalten*” could not be used equivocally in the 1788 definition of pleasure but at the very least had to be employed analogically. Indeed, were the sense of “*erhalten*” equivocal across different kinds of pleasure, then it would be impossible to define pleasure as such and in general (which is what Kant attempted to do in 1788).<sup>11</sup> Now, while Kant does not himself raise *the problem of the analogy of pleasure* in §10 of the Analytic, he alludes to it in §12 of the Analytic. There Kant contrasts lingering (*weilen*) in the case of the beautiful with lingering in the case of the agreeable:

We linger [*weilen*] in contemplating the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself, which is *analogous* to (yet *not identical* with) [*analogisch (aber doch mit ihr nicht einerlei)*] the way in which we linger [*Verweilung*] when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly attracts attention, where the mind is passive.<sup>12</sup> (*KU, AA 05, 222:33–37*; my emphasis)

Now, in the beginning of §12 Kant states that aesthetic pleasure cannot be conceived as an effect of some representation (be it sensation or concept), for then the connection would be an *a posteriori* one. Such is indeed the case with the pleasure of the senses, in which there is a causal link between the object (whose existence pleases through sensation) and the feeling of pleasure. Indeed, for Kant an object is deemed agreeable precisely when it causally produces a pleasant sensation in the subject, and we cannot know which objects are pleasurable before we are affected by them.<sup>13</sup> In the quote above Kant summarizes this causal connection in terms of a charm (*Reiz*) exercising attraction on the subject's sensibility. But given that all pleasure is defined by a tendency to preserve itself, the pleasure of the senses can only be preserved when the charm affects the subject repeatedly (*wiederholentlich*). This is exactly what “*Verweilung*” means in relation to charm, i.e., it is a repetition of sensation. In the lines just before this quote, however, Kant contrasts the sort of causal connection (which we would be justified in calling “external”) that characterizes the agreeable with the internal causality at work in aesthetic pleasure. According to Kant, aesthetic pleasure “has a causality in itself [*Kausalität in sich*], namely that of maintaining [*zu erhalten*] the state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without further aim” (222:31–33).<sup>14</sup> To be sure, this statement is unmistakably similar to both definitions of pleasure (in §10 and the First Introduction). For the designation “inner causality” refers to the way in which the powers of the mind preserve

the mental state (of pleasure) by reciprocally promoting each other. And it is this very inner causality that Kant appears to reference in his description of lingering “in contemplating the beautiful” whereby “this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself.” Clearly, then, §12 of the *Analytic of the Beautiful* establishes that the preservation of pleasure (or lingering) is not the same (*nicht einerlei*) in the case of the beautiful and the agreeable. While the former depends on the inner causality of the mental faculties, the latter relies on the (external) causal power (charm) of the agreeable object. Yet, in the absence of univocity, as it were, Kant insists on the analogy between the two. Accordingly, Kant employs the term “*erhalten*,” as well as “*weilen*,” in relation to both kinds of pleasure, thereby making possible the general definition of pleasure in §10.

As we have just seen, the 1788 definition of pleasure presupposes the analogy between interested and disinterested pleasures; on the other hand, the 1789 transcendental definition strictly separates the former from the latter. To be sure, this distinction concerning interest is crucial for Kant’s doctrine of the beautiful; yet, the 1789 definition only emphasizes this distinction at the cost of its own generality. Perhaps, that is why Kant did not include the 1789 definition of pleasure in the published version to the *Critique of Judgment*. Indeed, it is understandable why Kant only preserved the 1788 definition in the *Critique of Judgment*, and yet doing so has the potential of causing some misunderstanding. For it is important to understand that Kant’s reduction of all pleasures to the function of preservation is based on a *mere analogy* rather than a full-blown identity (between pleasures). If Kant’s project of aesthetics in the *Critique of Judgment* is not to fail, interested and disinterested pleasures must not be confused. Perhaps, Kant thought that §12 of the *Analytic* was sufficient to preclude the confusion regarding the preservation of different kinds of pleasure. And yet, most commentators miss the fundamental distinction between lingering over the agreeable and lingering over the beautiful. This misunderstanding takes place, more specifically, when the tendency to maintain itself (or to linger) is considered to be the identical in all pleasures. This can happen in two different ways: It is either desire (or, at least, the language of desire) that is surreptitiously brought into the disinterested pleasure of the beautiful or the interest in (and dependence on) the (continued) existence of the object. The subject experiencing the beautiful is thus taken as motivated to continue judging the beautiful thing, i.e., interested in its continued existence.<sup>15</sup> Such misunderstanding is not completely unwarranted: In the *Analytic of the Beautiful* Kant does not say much more about the workings of aesthetic pleasure other than that it involves what he calls a “free play of the cognitive faculties.” In §9 of the *Analytic*, for instance, Kant suggests that the consciousness of the pleasure of the beautiful lies “in the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and understanding), enlivened through mutual agreement” (291:14–16). Yet, such misunderstanding has deleterious

consequences, for it compromises Kant's thesis about the disinterestedness of aesthetic judging (on which so much in the Analytic of the Beautiful hinges). But how does the representation of the beautiful exactly occasion this facilitated play of the cognitive powers? What is it that makes the cognitive powers reciprocally promote each other's activity in contemplating the beautiful rather than cease their activity? My suggestion is that the pleasure of reflection neither has interest in the existence of the object nor involves any kind of subjective "motivation" or "endeavoring" to remain in the mental state; instead, aesthetic pleasure preserves itself through the inner causality (of the cognitive powers). In this I am determined to take Kant's disinterestedness thesis at face value and to try to show that the pleasure of aesthetic reflection is disinterested in the full sense of the term.<sup>16</sup> And it is Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas that will demonstrate this most evidently. Thus, it is by looking at aesthetic ideas that we will be able to make sense of what causes the free play of the faculties and lingering over the beautiful. Henceforth, I propose to read the Aesthetics part of the *Critique of Judgment* in a reverse order: first, I will consider Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas; second, I will read this conception back into the Analytic of the Beautiful (with a particular attention to the problem of the analogy of pleasure).

### 3. HOW AESTHETIC IDEAS WORK

Kant introduces aesthetic ideas in §§43–53 of the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgment, where he addresses the nature of beautiful art and genius. Let us consider Kant's seemingly contradictory definition of beautiful art: "art can only be called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature" (306:14–15). Now, it appears as contradictory because Kant considers (mechanical) art and nature to be wholly different from each other. But then how can beautiful art be (or look like) art and nature at once? For while art is based on purposive intention (i.e., the concept of what the object to be made ought to look like), production in nature lacks precisely such intention.<sup>17</sup> Kant's definition of art, however, reflects precisely the middling state between mechanical art and nature that beautiful art somewhat paradoxically occupies. Now, as far as production is concerned, the artist conceives of the form of the object before she makes it, such that this representation precedes (and causes) the existence of the product. On the other hand, the existence of beautiful art is not exhausted by the concept of what the thing ought to be—herein lies its difference from mechanical art. The claim that beautiful art is partially undetermined in relation to the concept stems from Kant's understanding of beauty as non-conceptual, and it gives rise to his conception of genius. In §45 Kant reminds us that beauty (whether artificial or natural) "pleases in the mere judging (neither in sensation nor through a concept)" (305:25–26). Given that the products of mechanical art



are determined by the concept of an end, then, it is impossible to judge them aesthetically, without a concept. “If the intention were aimed at the production of a determinate object, then, if it were achieved through art, the object would please only through concepts” (306:30–32). But that means that if beautiful art is to be beautiful, i.e., to occasion the “feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties,” it must appear as (at least partially) unintentional (306:17–18). And that is precisely what Kant means when he says that beautiful art, although it unquestionably belongs to the genus of art, nonetheless ought to appear like nature.

Yet, in order for beautiful art to appear like nature, nature has to play an actual role in its production, and that is what Kant calls genius. In §46 of the Deduction Kant defines genius (*Genie* or *genius*) as “the inborn predisposition of the mind (*ingenium*) through which nature gives the rule to art” (307:14–15). By attributing genius primarily to nature, Kant underlines that somewhat paradoxically “the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how the ideas for it come to him” (308:07–09). Thus, the term “genius” designates precisely what nature affords the artist in the process of making beautiful art (which the artist herself can neither explain nor reproduce at will). In a certain sense, then, it is genius that is primarily responsible for beautiful art, while the human artist herself is but an accidental cause of it. More precisely, nature (through the faculty of genius) provides the artist with “a representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the presentation of this concept” (317:25–27). While the former refers to the concept of the thing (in the absence of which it is impossible to make anything), the latter refers precisely to that indeterminate principle (afforded by nature) that makes art beautiful. And this indeterminate representation afforded by genius is what makes beautiful art partially undetermined by the concept. It is important to understand at this point that the notions of form and matter in Kant’s philosophy are relative; therefore, it is not contradictory for Kant to deny the role of material in beauty in the Analytic, and yet associate genius with material in the Deduction. Now, the concept of aesthetic ideas is introduced by Kant in §49 to designate exactly the material that the genius affords, i.e., “that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking [*viel zu denken veranlaßt*] though without it being possible for any determinate [*bestimmter*] thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it” (314:02–04). But Kant’s definition cannot but immediately appear problematic: Given that the human cognition is necessarily discursive (i.e., conceptual), how can thinking (let alone *much* thinking) without determinate concepts be possible?<sup>18</sup>

The key to resolving this apparent problem lies within Kant’s specification that aesthetic ideas give rise to *no determinate concept*, which is *not* to say that *no concept whatsoever* is involved. For there may be concepts *other* than determinate (i.e., indeterminate ones), though such indeterminate concepts would



be called concepts only improperly. As I hope to show, Kant's conception of the beautiful is neither strictly conceptual nor strictly non-conceptual; rather, it is *indeterminately conceptual*. Kant uses the terms "indeterminate (*unbestimmt*)," as well as "undeveloped (*unentwickelt*)," throughout §43–53 to describe the kind of thinking to which aesthetic ideas give rise. Now, the problem of Kant's definition of aesthetic ideas is in fact intimately linked with two other apparently problematic moments in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. First, in the Analytic of the Beautiful Kant says time and time again that, although the free play involves the faculties of imagination and understanding, it is to be taken as devoid of any determinate concept. In §9, for example, Kant describes it as follows: "The powers of cognition that are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no determinate [*bestimmter*] concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition" (217:21–23). But then it is hard to see how the the faculty of the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, could be involved in such a play without concepts.<sup>19</sup> And in §35 of the Deduction Kant writes that "since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness" (287:16–20). Here it is equally difficult to see how the activity of schematism could be possible without a concept, "given that," in Ginsborg's words, "the very notion of schematism . . . appears to presuppose a concept which is schematized" (2015a, 97).<sup>20</sup> As I will show, resolving either of these three difficulties will by necessity implicate the other two. In fact, it is *only* possible to resolve either of them by considering (and resolving) them in conjunction. Such is the complex relationship that Kant draws between aesthetic ideas, schematism, and indeterminate thinking. The latter (indeterminate thinking) will indeed afford a major clue for understanding how aesthetic ideas fit into Kant's theory of the beautiful.

However, it is not possible to fully understand Kant's notion of indeterminate thinking (i.e., thinking involving no determinate concepts) without broaching the question of schematism and empirical concept formation. To be sure, this is not to say that schematism (as described in the first *Critique*) or empirical concept formation are equivalent to or include (as a species) the judgment of the beautiful. However, as I hope to show, it is particularly helpful to consider schematism and empirical concept generation for understanding aesthetic judging, in regard to both the latter's similarities with the former two, and, most importantly, its fundamental difference from them. Now, Kant emphasizes the kinship between judging reflectively (in general) and searching for empirical concepts in §V of the unpublished Introduction: "The principle of reflection [i.e., the principle of purposiveness] on given objects of nature is that for all things in nature empirically determinate concepts can be found" (*EEKU*, AA 20, 211:25–27). This

kinship with the activity of empirical concept generation is preserved, I hope to show, in reflective judgments of taste, even though no determinate empirical concepts issue from them.

Now, one of the fundamental claims of Kant's philosophy (perhaps, *the* fundamental claim) is that the human cognitive faculty involves not one but two (heterogeneous) elements: receptive sensibility (the faculty of intuitions) and spontaneous understanding (the faculty of concepts). The former is responsible for receiving the sensible manifold (that is *given*), while the latter affords this manifold the form of unity, i.e., structures it by means of the transcendental concepts or categories. In the Introduction to the *Analytic of Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason* Kant describes the Schematism chapter as dealing "with the sensible conditions under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed" (*KrV*, A136/B175). The question of the Schematism chapter is thus occasioned precisely by the fundamental heterogeneity between the understanding and sensibility: Concepts cannot be intuited through the senses, and vice versa. To make this heterogeneity evident, let us consider Kant's example of the empirical concept of a dog:

The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the sphere of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit *in concreto*. (A141/B180)

Such is the gap between any particular dog and the concept of a dog as a four-footed animal in Kant's own example: the latter is far too general, the former is far too concrete. For Kant, however, cognition consists precisely in subsuming sensible appearances under rules, thus in bridging the gap between concepts and intuitions. On the basis of this Kant claims that a mediating third term is called upon in cognition, a term "which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other" (A138/B177). This is precisely what a transcendental schema accomplishes: "This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema" (A138/B177). Thus, schemata are hybrid functions mediating the subsumption of an appearance, say, a particular dog, under the general concept of a dog.

Yet, the concept of a dog is not innate in the understanding (unlike the pure concepts or categories) but must be acquired in experience *before* it can be applied to appearances. Then, although in the Schematism chapter Kant appears to suggest that a schema exists only for the sake of applying an already existent concept to appearances, nevertheless, if concepts and intuitions are heterogeneous, then it is impossible to immediately acquire concepts out of sensible representations *either*. This is to say that empirical concept formation is as much in need of me-

diation (i.e., of a third term) as is the activity of subsuming appearances under already existent concepts (whether pure or empirical).<sup>21</sup> To be sure, the function of mediation between empirical concepts and appearances ought to be fulfilled by (empirical) schemata, except that in empirical concept formation, in Longuenesse's words, "schemata are acquired *before* the concepts, which reflect them" (2000: 116n29). When it is a matter of empirical concept generation, therefore, the relationship between concepts and schemata is reversed: We require schemata in order to generate concepts out of the sensible given rather than subsume the latter under the former. In the *Jäsche Logic* Kant describes empirical concept formation as involving comparison, reflection, and abstraction:

To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able to compare, to reflect, and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree. (*JL*, AA 09, 94:28–95:02)

But what is compared in the process of concept generation could not be the concepts of trunk, branches, and leaves, for those marks already belong to the concept of a tree. Otherwise, we would be presupposing the very cognitive achievement (i.e., the concept of a tree) that the activity of comparison is supposed to afford us, thereby lapsing into an unacceptable circularity. From this it follows that it must be schemata rather than concepts themselves that are compared for the sake of producing an empirical concept. By quoting one of Kant's unpublished notes, Longuenesse emphasizes that schemata are equivalent to what Kant calls rules of apprehension (*Regeln der Auffassung*): "We compare only what is universal in the rule of our apprehension. For example, one sees a sapling, so one has the representation of a tree; an elongated rectangle makes one think of a square" (*Refl.*, AA 16, 557:08–10).<sup>22</sup> The rules of apprehension not only lend themselves to comparison for the sake of concept generation but also in some sense already possess a certain kind of universality. Appropriately, Kant writes in one of the unpublished notes: "This community of representations presupposes a comparison, not of perceptions, but of our apprehension, insofar as it contains the presentation of an as yet undetermined concept [*noch unbestimmten Begriffs*], and is in itself universal" (*Refl.*, AA 16, 558:11–14). In the context of empirical concept generation, therefore, Kant's schemata designate something like potentially universal representations or concepts. As far as schemata are concerned, then, potentiality implies that the rules of apprehension are not concepts *yet*; however, it is possible to develop them into concepts (though,

as I will show, *not* in aesthetic judgments of reflection). Thus, my suggestion is that Kant's conception of indeterminate, undeveloped concepts refers exactly to the schemata which are at work in empirical concept formation *albeit with certain modifications*.

As far as ordinary cognition is concerned, the understanding compares schemata in order to generate empirical concepts out of them. Kant explains that empirical concepts are made up of marks connected in relations of coordination and subordination: "Marks are coordinate, insofar as each of them is represented as an immediate mark of the thing and are subordinate insofar as one mark is represented in the thing only by means of the other" (*JL*, AA 09, 58:08–11). Let us take the concept of beautiful art, which Kant defines by genus and species, as an example. The coordinate marks of the concept of beautiful art are the following: that it appears like nature and that it is at the same time mechanical. The subordinate mark of the concept of beautiful art, on the other hand, is that it is a species of the genus "art." All empirical concepts are thus systematized in a genera-species structure: while subordinate marks include generic marks, coordinate marks function as specific differences. Accordingly, to make a distinct concept is to specify its coordinate and subordinate marks. In other words, distinct are those cognitions that assign an object in question a determinate place in the genera-species structure. In consequence, it is only those schemata that are expedient in this task that the understanding considers in concept formation. Herein lies the logical perfection of the concept, according to Kant, and it is through comparison, as well as reflection, of empirical schemata that logical perfection is attained.

In the judgment of the beautiful, by contrast, it is exactly this distinctness of cognition that is missing, which is to say that in its schemata are not reflected under a determinate concept—such is the fundamental difference between aesthetic and cognitive judging. But if the goal of empirical cognition lies in logical distinctness, then in aesthetic judging something must be preventing the understanding from reaching that goal. It is fitting to quote Longuenesse at this juncture again:

What makes judgments merely reflective [i.e., of the beautiful] is that in them, the effort of the activity of judgment to form concepts fails. And it fails because it cannot succeed. This is the case in 'merely reflective' aesthetic judgment, where the agreement of imagination and understanding is of such a nature that it cannot be reflected under any concept. (2000: 164)<sup>23</sup>

In aesthetic judgments, therefore, the activity of schematism is in some way prevented from attaining full-fledged concepts. But let us be careful with describing aesthetic judgments as failed, unsuccessful judgments—the failure of aesthetic judging is *unlike* any other failure. For this failure is a failure not of deficiency

but of *excess*, of *superabundance*. Now, as Kant explains in §49, the faculty of genius (as a talent of the imagination) is capable of providing “unsearched for, extensive rich material for the understanding, which the latter did not consider in its concept” (*KU*, AA 05, 317:2–3). If in empirical cognition the understanding considers only those schemata that are expedient in making a distinct concept, then in aesthetic reflection it is faced with “supplementary representations [*Nebenvorstellungen*] for which no expression is found” (316:7).<sup>24</sup> As Kant puts it, aesthetic ideas open “an immeasurable field of related [*verwandter*] representations” (315:23–24). And it is precisely because the field of related representations is immeasurable that no concept can be adequate to it. As Rudolf Makkreel puts it, “[thought] . . . is here occasioned by an excess of intuitive content that cannot be contained within the concepts of the understanding” (1990: 121). Indeed, in §49 of the Deduction Kant writes that aesthetic ideas “gives more [*mehr*] to think about that can be grasped and made distinct in it” (315:6–8). And a bit later Kant writes that aesthetic ideas give “the imagination an impetus to think more [*mehr*], although in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept” (315:28–30). The failure of the judgment of taste is thus by no means a failure of judging, or of thinking; rather, the failure has to do with the incapacity of any determinate concept to contain and comprehend the excess of thought that characterizes aesthetic reflection.

However, the failure of determination in the judgment of the beautiful does not have to do with quantity (i.e., “*mehr*”) of thought alone, as it were. It is not just that the beautiful thing is pregnant with more schemata than an ordinary object of cognition. Rather, the sensible features of a beautiful object—its aesthetic attributes, in Kant’s language—are organized (by nature or genius) into a specific non-conceptual kind of unity, which Kant describes in terms of affinity or kinship (*Verwandtschaft*). Thus, Allison speaks of “the organization or unity of these attributes . . . in virtue of which they constitute a single aesthetic idea, in contrast, say, to a random ‘heap’ of disconnected images” (2001: 283).<sup>25</sup> It is thanks to this affinity of aesthetic attributes that the understanding does not (and cannot) select just those schemata that are expedient in making a distinct concept but considers them as a totality (which, to repeat, cannot be brought under a determinate concept).<sup>26</sup> Importantly, what Kant calls affinity here designates a kind of unity that is non-conceptual, as well as non-synthetic. An aesthetic idea, in Makkreel’s words, “suggests significant affinities even where direct conceptual connections cannot be demonstrated” (1990: 121).<sup>27</sup> Neither can the unity in question be comprehended in any determinate rule, which is to say that the understanding cannot generate a concept out of an aesthetic idea, even though the latter is thick with schemata. While in the discussion of aesthetic ideas Kant does not employ the language of schematism, in §35 he suggests that the activity of the imagination in aesthetic reflection lies precisely in “schematizing without

a concept.” Such is the link between aesthetic ideas and schematizing without a concept: the former occasion so much (indeterminate) thinking, as it were, that the latter is incapable of obtaining a determinate concept. That is, “[although] aesthetic ideas occasion much thinking, they are, strictly speaking, ineffable” (Makkreel 1990: 122). Although it might sound paradoxical at first, the failure of (conceptual) determination in the case of the beautiful in fact stems from its *excess of determinability*. Then, *pace* Longuenesse, not only can schematism precede concept formation but it can also *never arrive at concepts* (as it occurs in aesthetic reflection).

#### 4. THE TIME OF EXCESS, THE TIME OF LINGERING

Once Kant offers his definition of beautiful art (i.e., in order to judge beautiful art we must be aware that it is art, and yet it must appear as nature), he also introduces a correlative reformulation of natural beauty: “Nature was beautiful, if at the same time it looked like art” (*KU*, AA 05, 306:20–21). This is how Kant appears to read his considerations of beautiful art back into the account of natural beauty: In order to judge natural beauty we must be aware that it is nature, and yet it must appear like art. But if art is defined by Kant as production through rational intention, then nature appears like art when it looks *as if* designed (for some purpose). But that is just what Kant means by purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) in general. In §10 of the *Analytic of the Beautiful* Kant succinctly defines purposiveness as follows: “an end [*Zweck*] is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former . . . and the causality of a concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (*forma finalis*)” (220:01–04).<sup>28</sup> In the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant explains that in order to make nature comprehensible we ought to presuppose that nature lends itself to concept generation (as well as application). But that in turn requires representing nature *as if* it were designed by a superhuman understanding proceeding in a manner that is appropriate for the cognitive powers of the human subject. Purposiveness here does not entail that nature is an actual creation of the superhuman craftsperson; instead, we presuppose it to be such a creation “merely because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with ends” (220:19–21). Therefore, the principle of the purposiveness of nature has a quite specific cognitive purpose, that of the “comprehensibility [*Faßlichkeit*] of nature” (187:28). Yet, as we already know, the judgment of the beautiful, and it too relies on the principle of purposiveness, affords no discursive comprehension, fulfills no cognitive purpose. Rather, the beautiful has to do with a mere animation of the cognitive powers without any concept as its outcome. Kant appropriately describes the purposiveness of the beautiful as a “purposiveness without a purpose” (241:15). This means that the

representation is suitable to the cognitive powers without thereby fulfilling any purpose (cognitive or otherwise), i.e., it is suitable to them in form alone.<sup>29</sup> Now, it is impossible to provide an objective explanation why some objects appear as beautiful (while others do not), for that would vitiate Kant's claim that judgments of taste are not objective judgments. In Ginsborg's words, "[i]t has to remain an inexplicable fact that some objects give rise to the free play of the faculties and others do not" (2015b, 51–52).<sup>30</sup> This is exactly what is anomalous about the beautiful: It is so singularly adapted to us that it cannot be taken as a mere natural happenstance. That is, it cannot but appear as a consequence of an intelligent design. Appropriately, in §61 of the Teleology part Kant describes the beautiful things as products of nature which "contain a form so specifically suited for it [i.e., the power of judgment] that by means of their variety and unity they serve as it were to strengthen and entertain the mental powers (which are in play in the use of these faculties)" thereby appearing "just as if they had actually been designed for our power of judgment" (*KU*, AA 05, 359: 08–12).

Now, in every cognitive judgment, according to Kant, "a given object brings the imagination into activity for the synthesis of the manifold, while the imagination brings the understanding into activity for the unification of the manifold into concepts" (238:30–32). Given that the two faculties pursue divergent goals, in order for them to engage in a productive activity, one of them must get the upper hand over (and coerce) the other. Kant writes in §49 of the Deduction: "in the use of the imagination for cognition, the imagination is under the coercion of the understanding and is subject to the limitation of being adequate to its concept" (316:28–30). But the imagination is also under the constraint of the sensible given, i.e., the imagination must correspond to what is given rather than freely produce a shape. So, the imagination is under a double constraint here: 1. It is restricted by what is given in perception; 2. It is restricted by the faculty of concepts.<sup>31</sup> Yet, these constraining influences fall away in the judgment of taste: As I am about to show, in aesthetic judging the faculty of the imagination appears to be restricted neither by the sensible given nor by the principle of conceptual unity. With regard to the former constraint, Kant suggests that "it is . . . quite conceivable that the object [of nature] can provide it with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the manifold as the imagination would design . . . if it were left free by itself" (241:31–242:02).<sup>32</sup> But as Kant indicates in the preceding sentence, the imagination is in free play precisely in poetizing (*Dichten*) (240:31). As the reference to "*Dichten*" suggests, Kant might be comparing and contrasting the imagination at work in apprehension with the way in which it is employed by genius. By analogy with artistic creation, then, Kant suggests that the figurative technique (*technica speciosa*) of nature can supply us with such forms that in apprehending them the imagination sees itself *as if* containing the very volitions (albeit unbeknownst to itself) by which



these forms were designed. In other words, it considers itself an “authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions” (240:27–28). Here the imagination must be paradoxically considered not as reproductive but as productive and self-active, although it is *de facto* bound to the sensible given. In apprehending beauty of nature the faculty of imagination is *inventive without invention*, as it were. Now, we have seen that artistic genius creates beautiful art without herself knowing how the ideas for it came to her. On the other hand, the beautiful things of nature exhibit such suitability to our mental powers that we have an impression that we invented them ourselves.<sup>33</sup> Herein lies the ambivalence between natural and artistic beauty: Although beautiful art is created by an artist, the artist is but an accidental cause of it; although natural beauty is an “artistic” creation of nature, the observer cannot but imagine herself as the artist.

The significance of this ambivalence, however, lies precisely in that it shows that in judging natural beauty the imagination escapes the double constraint that is imposed on it in normal cognition. For just as the distinction between activity and passivity disappears in the way that the imagination apprehends beautiful forms, the understanding no longer interferes with the activity of the imagination (with the requirement of conceptual unification). Now, according to §35 of the Deduction, the free activity of the imagination in aesthetic judging consists exactly in schematization without a concept. Here the imagination is free to apprehend any sensible patterns in the given, including those that are inexpedient in the task of distinct cognition (and which would otherwise not be considered at all). So, the imagination schematizes excessively, abundantly, and without specific regard for the business of the understanding. And neither is aesthetic representation compared with other objects in accordance with concepts (and for the sake of generating them).<sup>34</sup> While in logical judgment the imagination serves the understanding, Kant goes as far as to say that in aesthetic judging “it is the understanding that is in the service of the imagination and not the other way round” (242:19–20). But although on this formulation aesthetic judging might appear as based on a mere reversal of the relationship of coercion, it is the entire zero-sum game between the two faculties that is interrupted, by a kind of happy accident. In aesthetic judging the mental faculties enter into a relation of fortunate harmony, and neither gets the upper hand.<sup>35</sup> Holding no grudges against the understanding, as it were, the faculty of the imagination schematizes without a concept not to spite the understanding but “in agreement with the lawfulness of the understanding in general” (241:02–03), such that the latter too gains from this activity. This is what Kant means when he writes that, although the understanding serves the imagination, “[it] does not thereby suffer any offense [*Anstoß*]” (242:26). But given that the German word *Anstoß* literally means something like interruption (i.e., bumping into something), we might say that in its free lawfulness the imagination lets the understanding itself

engage in an uninterrupted activity. In the presence of a beautiful object the imagination schematizes more properties than can be conceptually determined, and the understanding considers various possibilities of conceptualizing these properties without halting the advance of reflection. It is as if in this unique arrangement of the cognitive powers each faculty provoked the other to a more lively performance (than is possible in normal cognition) and brought the other to excel. Now, what is of concern in Kant's conception of the beautiful, according to Makkreel, is a holistic way of thinking, i.e., a way of "conceiving [the subject's] coexisting faculties as a unity" (1990: 78). But an even deeper holism, I would argue, lies in a unification (or reconciliation) of activity and passivity that Kant's doctrine of the beautiful suggests.<sup>36</sup> That is, in beauty what is (passively) given becomes indistinguishable from what the subject would (actively) create herself. Or: in aesthetic judging it is as if the imagination apprehended its own voluntary creation at the same time as it created the very sensible given that it receives, however self-contradictory that may sound.

In §51 of the Deduction Kant proclaims that "[b]eauty (whether it be beauty of nature or of art) can in general be called the expression [*Ausdruck*] of aesthetic ideas" (320:10–11). Then, the sections on beautiful art and aesthetic ideas ought to lead not only to a rereading of the Analytic of the Beautiful, but the latter might not even be fully understood without the former.<sup>37</sup> Before we defend this thesis, however, the term "expression (*Ausdruck*)" must be briefly explicated. I would suggest that "*Ausdruck*" here refers to the process by which a specific kind of non-conceptual unity (which defines the beautiful thing) is produced out of its heterogeneous elements, i.e., aesthetic attributes (which depend on each other in order to produce that unity).<sup>38</sup> As I have already suggested, the said dependence refers to what Kant describes in terms of affinity or kinship (*Verwandtschaft*) in §49 of the Deduction. In other words, beauty is not a mere sum of the diverse aesthetic attributes of the thing but an expression of the unity thereof (which is, importantly, non-conceptual). And it is this specific kind of unity that occasions much thought without any determinate concept being adequate to it. At this juncture, we are finally in a position to bring together the three questions posited earlier in this article: 1. How is discursive thinking that does not arrive at a determinate concept possible?; 2. How is the free play of the imagination and understanding (as a faculty of concepts) without a determinate concept is possible?; 3. How is schematizing without a determinate concept possible? The key to resolving all three issues lies in Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas. That is, if aesthetic ideas occasion thought (rather than, say, nonsense), then the intuitions afforded by them are lawful in relation to the understanding, i.e., potentially determinable, thinkable by the understanding. Thence, there is nothing contradictory about the faculty of understanding participating in the free play of the faculties (which at once refers to the activity of schematizing). Yet, given that

aesthetic ideas occasion *more* thought than can be comprehended in a concept, no conceptual determination is possible in the judgment of the beautiful. In Förster's words, the free play of the faculties "denotes an essential inexhaustibility of the aesthetic object in the sense that it allows for an indeterminate number of interpretations, no single one of which is definitive or conclusive" (2012: 131). Kant's conception of the play of the faculties thus refers to nothing other than the response that the human subject has to the inexhaustibility of an aesthetic idea, one that, as we are about to see, is essentially inconclusive, thus necessarily persists over a period of time.

The time of lingering in contemplating the beautiful is opened up by the very excess of determinability contained in an aesthetic idea. And it is within that same space, or time, that the free play of the cognitive faculties comes to happen. For not only does an aesthetic idea occasion much thought but it actually gives us more to think than can be conceptually determined. This means that, although the representation of the beautiful is thick with interrelated schemata (for that is what Kant means by "*Verwandtschaft*"), it cannot be resolved in a definite concept. Given that conceptual determination is the stopping point of the activity of schematism, however, in the absence of it, nothing can halt aesthetic reflection. In the judgment of the beautiful, therefore, the play of the mental faculties never reaches its culmination but preserves itself indefinitely. This is exactly what Kant means by the term "lingering" in §12: We linger in contemplating the beautiful because it gives us more possibilities of thought than we can definitively process.<sup>39</sup> The German verb "*weilen*" (as well as the noun "*Verweilung*") suggests precisely such tarrying without a determinate goal, as well as delay and deferral.<sup>40</sup> It is this sense of "*weilen*" that is to be contrasted with the preservation of pleasure in the case of the agreeable (which depends on the repeated attraction of a charm). Thus, the pleasure of the beautiful maintains itself by cognitive means alone (though without making any contribution to cognition), i.e., by means of the reciprocal activity of the imagination and the understanding provoked by an aesthetic idea.<sup>41</sup> As far as aesthetic pleasure is concerned, then, the mind is active, i.e., it does not depend on material sensations, without at the same time involving desire or interest of any sort.<sup>42</sup> Kant's concept of pleasure in the *Critique of Judgment* is thus neither univocal (which would compromise the fundamental distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures) nor equivocal (which compromise the unity of Kant's theory of pleasure); instead, it is conceived analogically. While both interested and disinterested pleasure can be understood in terms of the fundamental tendency to preserve itself, aesthetic, disinterested pleasure maintains itself in a manner radically different from the interest-based pleasure of the senses. Indeed, Kant's explanation of aesthetic ideas in §49 and his explanation of aesthetic judgment in the Analytic of the Beautiful taken together ought to preclude all attempts to conceive of the activity of aesthetic judging either as

intentional-motivational in structure, or as having some implicit connection with the faculty of desire, or as depending on the continued existence of the beautiful object. Aesthetic judging does not stem from our will or desire—it is not that we necessarily want to continue judging beauty; rather, we *cannot stop* judging beauty.<sup>43</sup> Now, although much of this can be shown on the basis of the Analytic of the Beautiful (especially, §12) alone, it is in Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas (considered in relation to natural beauty) that the nature of aesthetic lingering is rendered most evident. The time of the beautiful, the time of lingering, is the time of the self-maintaining activity of the mental faculties, which is occasioned by an *excess of thinking contained in an aesthetic idea*.<sup>44</sup>

## 5. CONCLUSION

What I hope to have shown in this essay is that the problem of the preservation of aesthetic pleasure (and, correspondingly, of lingering) can be solved without reference to the faculty of desire. It is only by eliminating the role of desire and interest in aesthetic judgment that Kant's thesis about the disinterestedness of the judgment of taste (on which so much in the *Critique of Judgment* hinges) can be preserved. While Kant's transcendental definition of pleasure in the unpublished Introduction is sensitive to the distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures, his general definition in §10 of the Analytic of the Beautiful explains all pleasure (whether interested or disinterested) in terms of its own preservation, thereby potentially causing some misunderstanding as regards the role of interest. It is indeed difficult to understand how aesthetic pleasure can be maintained (and we can correspondingly linger over beauty) without the participation of desire on the basis of the Analytic of the Beautiful alone. In response to this problem, and in accordance with §51, where Kant says that all beauty is an expression of aesthetic ideas, I have tried to read the Analytic of the Beautiful through the prism of Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas. My suggestion is that aesthetic pleasure can preserve itself in the contemplation of the beautiful object without arriving at a determinate concept, precisely because beauty (as an expression of an aesthetic idea) occasions *more* thinking than can be adequately resolved in a concept. This is how Kant's theory of aesthetic ideas helps explain the maintenance of aesthetic pleasure by cognitive means alone, without dependence on desire (although, to be sure, aesthetic judgments do not contribute anything to cognition either). The latter is what Kant identifies as lingering in the case of the beautiful, as opposed to (but still analogous with) lingering in the case of the agreeable.

## NOTES

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1. Cf. Allison 2001: 85–97; Guyer 1978; Zuckert 2007: 262–78.
2. Cf. Zammito 1992: 4–5, 87, 90.
3. In fact, the judgment of the instrumental good—I shall leave the moral good aside here—can be fully reduced to that of the agreeable, for since the instrumental good cannot be desired on account of itself, it can only be desired as a *means towards something agreeable*: cf. Allison 2001: 93.
4. Cf. also *KU*, *AA* 05, 217.
5. Cf. Longuenesse 2006: 198–9.
6. Although Kant calls all three relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, I will use the expression “aesthetic pleasure” or “aesthetic judgment” to refer to the pleasure of the beautiful alone.
7. Cf. also Fricke 1990: 17.
8. As Kant puts it, “interested pleasure always has at the same time a relation to the faculty of desire” (*KU*, *AA* 05, 204:23–24). On the other hand, aesthetic disinterested pleasure “is not necessarily connected with desire” (*MS*, *AA* 06, 212:13–14).
9. Cf. Fricke 1990: 107.
10. Cf. Zuckert 2007: 232–3.
11. Cf. Sweet (2009: 65–6), who argues that pleasure in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* is univocal. I would suggest, on the other hand, that it is analogical rather than univocal.
12. I disagree with Friedlander’s suggestion that Kant specifically contrasts “*weilen*” and “*Verweilung*” in §12 of the *Analytic* (or anywhere else) (2015: 34). Rather, in order to appreciate the distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable, one has to look into the sort of causality that underlies either “*weilen*” or “*Verweilung*.”
13. Cf., for example, *KpV*, *AA* 05, 21.
14. A couple of lines above, Kant likewise suggests that aesthetic pleasure “contains . . . an internal causality [*innere Kausalität*] (which is purposive) with regard to the cognition in general” (*KU*, *AA* 05, 222:25–26).
15. Cf. Allison (2001: 97), who introduces an interest in the continued existence of the beautiful thing, as well as the language of “endeavoring,” which suggests dependence on desire; Zuckert (2007: 262–3), who finds an intentional-motivation structure in aesthetic pleasure, which suggests dependence on desire, as well; Fricke (1990: 79), who also describes the subject as “intending” or “*beabsichtigen*” to preserve the pleasure of the beautiful; and, especially, Guyer (1978), who outright denies that aesthetic pleasure can be disinterested, as well as disconnected from desire.
16. For objections similar to mine, cf. Ginsborg 2015b: 43–4. However, Ginsborg’s solution to this problem is entirely different and involves interpreting the activity of aesthetic reflection as self-referential.
17. Cf. *KU*, *AA* 05, 303.

18. Cf. *JL*, AA 09, 91.
19. Cf. Friedlander 2015: 33.
20. Cf. also Makkreel 1990: 55.
21. Cf. Fricke 1990: 116.
22. Cf. Longuenesse 2000: 118.
23. Cf. also Sweet 2009: 63–4.
24. Cf. Förster 2012: 130.
25. Cf. also Zuckert 2007: 201.
26. Cf. Förster 2012: 130.
27. Cf. also Makkreel 1990: 97–8.
28. For another, longer definition cf. *KU*, AA 5, 180.
29. Such is Kant's conception of subjective formal purposiveness (as opposed to the objective formal purposiveness of nature as a logical system): cf. *KU*, AA 5, 193.
30. Cf. also Longuenesse 2006: 211.
31. Cf. Henrich 1992: 53.
32. Cf. also Henrich 1992: 51.
33. Cf. *KU*, AA 05, 349:17–1, where Kant speaks of mineral crystallization whose "shape of extreme beauty . . . art could hardly think up."
34. Cf. *KU*, AA 05: 278; Fricke 1990: 69–71.
35. Cf. *KU*, AA 05, 238; Fricke 1990: 166–72; Makkreel 1990: 62–3.
36. My suggestion is that Kant's system of the mental faculties as a whole could be organized around the conceptual opposition of activity and passivity: While some faculties are either entirely active (e.g., reason) or entirely passive (e.g., sensibility), others include both activity and passivity (e.g., the imagination).
37. Somewhat similarly, Allison (2001) suggests that the claim that beauty consists in the expression of aesthetic ideas merely makes explicit an important dimension that is there implicitly all along: Cf. 286–9. Cf. also Förster 2012: 132.
38. I largely follow Friedlander's understanding of the term "expression" in Kant here: cf. Friedlander 2015: 83.
39. For an equivalent of "lingering" for beautiful art, cf. 305.24–43, where Kant contrasts beautiful art with agreeable arts, which afford but "momentary [*augenblickliche*] entertainment, not . . . some enduring material for later reflection or discussion [*einen bleibenden Stoff zum Nachdenken oder Nachsagen*]." It is possible to conclude, then, that beautiful art affords material precisely for enduring reflection, in other words, lingering.
40. Friedlander is one of the few commentators who reads Kant's notion of lingering in terms of delay and deferral: Cf. 2015: 18–21; 30–1.
41. Makkreel (1990) identifies the purposive activity of the cognitive faculties in aesthetic judging with the feeling of life itself: "Aesthetic harmony is the feeling of life at its purest, i.e., as pure mental spontaneity" (p. 92).
42. Regarding how aesthetic reflection can be contemplative and active at once, cf. Makkreel 1990: 95.

43. Given that my description of aesthetic judging might lead to some confusion concerning its difference from the sublime, on the brief explanation of the difference between aesthetic ideas and the sublime, cf. Allison 2001: 340–1.
44. Concerning Friedrich Schiller's taking up of the Kantian temporality of the beautiful, cf. Acosta López, María del Rosario. "On an Aesthetic Dimension of Critique: The Time of the Beautiful in Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters*." In *Critique in German Philosophy*. Edited by María del Rosario Acosta López and J. Colin McQuillan. New York: SUNY (forthcoming).

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<i>EKU</i> , AA 20	<i>Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft</i>
<i>JL</i> , AA 09	<i>Jäsche Logik</i> (1800)
<i>KrV</i>	<i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft</i> (1781, 1787)
<i>KU</i> , AA 05	<i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i> (1790)
<i>MS</i> , AA 06	<i>Metaphysik der Sitten</i> (1797–1798)
<i>Refl.</i>	<i>Handschriftliche Nachlaß</i> (AA 14–23)

I use the English translations of these texts from *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992–), with occasional minor modifications.

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